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How the Polish banking sector 
has survived the global crisis
Poland’s banking sector has coped 
well with the global financial crisis, 
which started in 2008. Unlike most of 
its peers in Western Europe and some 
in Central Europe, it remained stable 
and profitable throughout the whole 
crisis, the volume of lending increased, 
and none of the banks needed direct 
financial support from public authori-
ties.
The objective of this article is to ex-
plain the sources of such an impressive 
performance, and to draw lessons on how 
to handle potential further turbulence in 
the global financial markets, driven by the 
on-going re-assessment of the sovereign 
debt risks, and prepare for new financial 
crises in the future.
The macroeconomic background
Poland weathered the global financial 
crisis with flying colors. It was the only 
country in the European Union to ex-
pand during the global financial crisis, 
growing by 1.6 percent in 2009 compared 
to a decline of 4.3 percent in EU-15 coun-
tries and 3.6 percent in the EU-10 region. 
Prospects are improving, with economic 
growth projected to accelerate to some 
4 percent in 2011 and 2012, although 
recent deceleration of the global growth 
and unresolved sovereign credit problems 
in the euro zone represent a significant 
downside risk to these forecasts2). None-
theless, the Polish economy is projected to 
grow faster than EU-10 and EU-15 and 
roughly in line with the whole of Europe 
and Central Asia (Figure 1). 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2011. World Bank projections for Poland 2011-12, May 2011.
Figure 1 Real GDP Growth in Poland, EU-10, EU-15 and ECA, 2008–12, (%)
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Such an impressive growth perfor-
mance reflected, among others, a num-
ber of factors. First, Poland had stronger 
macro-economic fundamentals before 
the crisis than most other EU-10 coun-
tries, including a relatively strong fiscal 
position, limited exposure to foreign 
trade, with exports representing about 
40 percent of GDP relative to 80 percent 
of GDP among regional peers, and lower 
dependence on external capital than the 
EU-10 average2). As a result, the govern-
ment was able to implement countercy-
clical, Keynesian fiscal and monetary 
policies, which helped cushion the slow-
down: general government deficit in-
creased from under 2 percent of GDP 
in 2007, to 3.6 percent in 2008, 7.2 per-
cent in 2009 and 7.9 percent of GDP in 
2010, while interest rates were gradually 
cut from 6 percent in November 2008 to 
3.5 percent in August 2009 (and reserve 
requirements were reduced from 3.5 per-
cent to 3.0 percent). 
Second, Poland was able to sig-
nificantly step up the utilization of EU 
funds, including in highly productive 
investments in infrastructure: inflows of 
EU funds increased from 1.3 percent of 
GDP in 2007-08 to 2.2 percent of GDP 
in 2009, more than in the Czech and 
Slovak Republic and only slightly less 
than in Hungary (Figure 2). 
Third, a floating exchange rate, which 
allowed zloty to depreciate by 30 percent 
in real effective terms, eased adjustment 
to external shocks, improved competi-
tiveness and supported exports. Finally, 
government’s skillful communication 
strategy, political stability, and support 
from international financial institutions, 
including extension of a US$20.5 billion 
Flexible Credit Line from the IMF in 
early 2009, helped maintain confidence 
among domestic consumers and global 
financial markets.
Figure 2 Absorption of EU funds, 2004-2009, in percent of GDP
Figure 3 ROE and capital adequacy ra-
tio of Poland’s banking sector, 2005-
2010
Source: National Bank of Poland and the Polish Finan-
cial Supervision Authority (KNF).
Source: World Bank, based on the European Commission.
Note: combined inflows from Cohesion and Structural Funds. 
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The banking sector during the 
crisis
Poland’s banking sector has proven 
to be remarkably resilient to the global 
financial crisis. Immediately after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, the Polish interbank market froze, 
and in the subsequent six months, the 
stock markets declined by close to one 
half and the zloty depreciated substantial-
ly. Nonetheless, Poland’s banking sector 
remained stable and profitable through-
out the whole crisis period (Figure 3). 
In 2009, net profit of the banking sector 
amounted to almost US$3 billion, only 
one third less than in the record 2008. 
None of the banks needed direct financial 
support from public authorities. 
Strong banking sector’s performance 
stemmed from several factors. First, Po-
land had a low initial level of corporate 
and household indebtedness, with credit 
amounting to less than 50 percent of 
GDP in 2008, much less than in other 
EU-10 countries (Figure 4). The slow 
speed of financial deepening reflected 
lagged effects of a restrictive monetary 
policy from the early 2000s, which damp-
ened GDP growth and credit demand, 
and a high stock of NPLs among banks 
during 2002-04, which weakened credit 
supply, especially to enterprises. Second, 
strong macroeconomic performance re-
duced the extent of an increase in un-
employment and supported corporate 
profitability, mitigating the rise in non-
performing loans (NPLs) to households 
from 3.5 percent in 2008 to 4.9 percent in 
2009, and to enterprises from 6.2 percent 
to 11.9 percent at the end of 2009. Total 
NPLs were much lower than among most 
other EU-10 countries (Figure 5). Third, 
real estate prices also held up quite well, 
declining by only around 10 percent on 
average, supporting the value of mortgage 
loan collateral (Figure 6). Finally, a wide 
distribution of household debt, with total 
household debt repayment exceeding 30 
percent of household budgets in only 8 
percent of Polish households, the lowest 
share among EU10 countries, also helped 
stem credit losses (Figure 7)6). 
Focus on the domestic market, con-
servative funding structures, and con-
tinued support from mother banks were 
also helpful. Banks operating in Poland 
have avoided investing in “toxic assets” 
abroad, largely because of being focused 
on the fast growing and profitable do-
mestic market. They have also largely 
maintained conservative lending poli-
cies, although credit policies had been 
progressively relaxed just before the crisis 
in response to rising real estate prices, 
high consumer confidence and abundant 
liquidity. The specific ownership struc-
ture of the Polish banking sector can 
partly explain the overall more conserva-
tive approach to lending than elsewhere 
in the region: the two largest banks in 
the market, the state-owned PKO BP 
Figure 4 Private credit to GDP, in per-
cent, 2005-10
Figure 5 Non-performing loans in EU-
10 countries, 2008-10
Source: FinStats (IFS).
Source: World Bank, based on Source: data from 
central banks.
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and the Italian (Unicredit)-owned Pekao 
SA maintained quite conservative lend-
ing policies, the former arguably because 
of its saving bank type risk-aversion, and 
the latter because of Unicredit’s negative 
experience with FX lending in Italy in 
early 1990’s.
Banks have also retained relatively 
conservative funding structures, with 
loan to deposit ratio not exceeding 120 
percent in 2008, lower than in most 
other EU-10 countries (Figure 8). Final-
ly, in contrast to foreign banks located 
in other EU-10 countries, subsidiaries 
of foreign banks in Poland, which hold 
a predominant position in the domestic 
bank market with more than two-thirds 
of the market, have not only maintained 
exposure to their Polish subsidiaries 
throughout the crisis, but even increased 
it to benefit from lower risk and higher 
returns than elsewhere (Figure 9). 
The role of financial supervision
Skillful policy intervention in sup-
porting the banking system has also been 
crucial, including before the onset of the 
crisis. Polish authorities have been proac-
tive in reducing risks in the banking sec-
tor already before the crisis. In 2006, as 
Figure 6 Share of household income used for debt repayments, in percent of all 
households, 2008
Figure 7 Growth in residential property 
ask prices in the largest cities in Po-
land, secondary market, 2007-10 
Source: World Bank (2009).
Figure 8 Loan to deposit ratio, 2005-
2010
Source: IFS.Source: National Bank of Poland.
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one of the first in the European Union, 
the National Bank of Poland (NBP) in-
troduced “Recommendation S”, which 
aimed at reducing foreign currency de-
nominated lending, by increasing loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios for FX mortgage loans 
and raising capital weights. This measure 
seems to have helped mitigate the rise in 
FX loans relative to other countries in the 
EU-10, despite the existing high interest 
rate differential between the domestic and 
foreign currency lending rates, which at-
tracted household demand (Figure 10). 
The measure has also helped stabilize 
LTV ratios at sound levels throughout the 
2008-2010 period (Figure 11). Together 
with more stringent internal bank lending 
policies, which limited access to FX loans 
to relatively better off households, these 
measures limited the rise in NPLs, despite 
a substantial depreciation of the zloty. 
Figure 10 Share of foreign currency denominated loans in total bank loans to 
households, 2008
Figure 9 Net foreign assets of the banking sector in selected EU-10 countries, in 
US$ billion
NPLs on foreign currency denominated 
loans have stabilized at a very low level of 
1.0-1.2 percent during the whole 2008-
2010 period, less than half of the level of 
NPLs for local currency mortgages. How-
ever, the improved quality of FX loans 
notwithstanding, “Recommendation S” 
was not fully effective in stemming the 
rise in FX loans, which continued until 
the onset of the global crisis in late 2008 
(Figure 12). 
Additional measures to improve 
banks’ liquidity have also been helpful. In 
June 2008, KNF introduced new liquid-
ity standards aimed at reducing bank’s 
vulnerability to reduced access to external 
financing. New standards were based on 
the “time-to-wall” concept that assumes 
that banks should normally operate dur-
ing 30 days without the need to seek ex-
ternal financing. Banks were authorized 
Source: KNF based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
Source: World Bank, national central banks.
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to come up with their own short, medium 
and long-term liquidity indicators based 
on internal models1, 5). As a result of the 
introduction of new standards, liquid-
ity position of Polish banks has started 
improving already before the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, ris-
ing from 17 percent in 2008 to 20.3 per-
cent in 2009. Hence, banks were better 
prepared to face the money market freeze 
in late 2008.
Policy interventions have substan-
tially intensified during the global crisis. 
KNF, NBP and the Ministry of Finance 
have undertaken a large number of in-
terventions to maintain banking sector’s 
stability, increase confidence, and boost 
domestic credit. While a large number 
of factors contributed to cushioning the 
impact of the crisis, several interventions 
are likely to have had the biggest impact. 
First, KNF’s intervention to encourage 
banks to retain the bulk of their record 
2008 profits, amounting to almost US$ 4 
billion, has substantially improved banks’ 
capital ratios from 11.2 percent in 2008 
to 13.3 percent at the end of 2009 (Figure 
13), boosting market confidence, reduc-
ing risks of a coordination failure among 
banks, providing a cushion against rising 
NPLs and reinvigorating lending, espe-
cially to households (Figure 14). 
KNF’s decision to request banks to 
submit daily reports on new exposures 
to foreign entities has also been helpful 
to reduce real and perceived risks among 
retail and corporate clients of a potential 
outflow of liquidity from domestic sub-
sidiaries to foreign parent-banks. Second, 
forceful actions by NBP to provide suffi-
cient local and foreign currency liquidity, 
supported by relatively high foreign cur-
Figure 12 Currency structure of new mortgage loans, 3Q2007-3Q2010
Figure 11 Average values of LTV of Swiss franc-denominated loans by quarter of 
loan origination
Source: 
National Bank of Poland.
Source: National Bank of Poland.
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rency reserves, promptly established swap 
and repo credit lines with the Swiss and 
the European Central Bank, and exten-
sion of a new US$20.5 billion precaution-
ary IMF Flexible Credit Line, supported 
market confidence, even though utiliza-
tion of the newly available facilities was 
not significant. 
Active money market operations by 
PKO BP, the state-owned bank, which 
unlike in other countries in the region 
has been a beneficiary of an outflow of 
deposits from foreign owned banks, was 
also helpful in reducing liquidity stress in 
the market. In contrast to foreign owned 
banks, which on the whole reduced their 
credit exposures during the crisis, relative 
insulation from global financial markets 
and a PLN 5 billion equity injection in 
October 2009, has helped PKO BP to 
increase lending during the crisis (Fig-
ure 15). Third, top-down and bottom-
up stress tests undertaken in early 2009 
by NBP and KNF, have helped enhance 
confidence in the solvency of domestically 
operating banks. Finally, improved public 
communication by the public authori-
ties, supported by establishment of new 
coordinating mechanisms, primarily the 
Financial Stability Committee, was also 
beneficial.
Regulatory reform momentum contin-
ued during the economic recovery. Draw-
ing on the lessons from the crisis, KNF 
has adopted a number of new regulations 
aimed at better insulating the domestic 
banking sectors against future crises. In 
2010, KNF amended “Recommendation 
A” to strengthen banks’ management of 
derivatives risks, amended “Recommen-
dation I” to improve bank’s internal FX 
management, and introduced new “Rec-
ommendation T” aimed at tightening 
criteria for local and foreign currency 
consumer lending, mandating that an 
individual cannot allocate more than 
half of his/her monthly income for a loan 
repayment (65 percent for wealthier in-
dividuals), and imposing a minimum 20 
percent down payment for FX-denomi-
nated mortgage loans. In January 2011, 
to further limit risks resulting from for-
eign currency lending, KNF amended 
“Recommendation S” to require banks 
to ensure, that in case of foreign cur-
rency mortgage lending the loan repay-
ment cannot exceed 42 percent of a cli-
ent’s monthly income (for maturities of 
up to 25 years, regardless of the actual 
maturity). 
In June 2011, it supplemented this 
measure by increasing capital weights on 
FX mortgage lending from 75 percent to 
100 percent, starting in 2012. KNF has 
also introduced periodical bottom-up 
stress tests, and started work on amend-
Figure 13 Dividend policy of banks operating in Poland and capital adequacy ra-
tio, 2002-2010, in billion PLN and percent
Source: KNF.
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ing legislation to facilitate transforma-
tion of foreign bank branches into do-
mestic subsidiaries operating under the 
Polish law, limiting potential spillovers 
from turbulence in foreign markets.
Poland’s success in insulating the fi-
nancial sector from the global economic 
turbulence was due to strong macro-eco-
nomic fundamentals before the crisis, in-
cluding a relatively strong fiscal position, 
relatively low dependence on external 
capital, and a limited exposure to for-
eign trade, a healthy and well capitalized 
banking sector and a timely and prudent 
policy interventions, which enhanced fi-
nancial sector’s stability even before the 
onset of the global crisis. Given the dark-
ening prospects for the global economy 
and the downside risks to the stability 
of the global financial system, to ensure 
continued healthy growth of the finan-
cial sector, Polish authorities will need to 
face a number of challenges on both the 
macroeconomic and financial sector side. 
On the macroeconomic side, Poland 
will need to maintain macroeconomic 
stability, especially by reducing general 
government deficit, and support growth 
by re-adjusting its post-crisis growth 
model in line with the recommenda-
tions of the new Warsaw Consensus4). 
On the financial sector side, it will be 
Note: growth in outstanding loans  
calculated in US$. Nine largest banks in Poland by assets, all foreign owned except for PKO BP.
Source: World Bank, based on BankScope.
Figure 15 Growth in lending in selected Polish banks, 2009 and 2010 (%)
Credit to HHS Credit to enterprises Credit growth









Figure 14 Structure and dynamics of real credit growth in EU-10 and EU-15, Oc-
tober 2008 to January 2011
Source: World Bank (2011).
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essential to further reduce foreign ex-
change denominated lending, design a 
new bank resolution framework, and ef-
ficiently implement new EU and global 
financial sector regulations. Specifically, 
Polish authorities will need to monitor 
whether the newly introduced regulatory 
measures will be able to effectively limit 
foreign currency lending to unhedged 
households. As of the mid-2011, foreign 
currency denominated mortgage loans 
still represented almost two-thirds of the 
total outstanding stock, although the 
share of FX lending in new loan genera-
tion has recently dropped substantially, 
partly in response to a recent substantial 
strengthening of the Swiss franc. 
Moreover, they will need to ensure com-
pliance with new EU and global financial 
sector regulations, including Basel III and 
Solvency II. Furthermore, the Polish au-
thorities might need to further strengthen 
the independence of the KNF and strength-
en its authority to issue legally binding sys-
temic regulations. They will also have to 
design a new bank resolution framework 
and introduce additional macro prudential 
measures. Lastly, to improve long-term sus-
tainability of banking sector’s funding and 
reduce reliance on foreign wholesale fund-
ing, it will be important to increase domes-
tic savings, particularly long-term ones, and 
develop new long-term financing instru-
ments, such as covered bonds.
